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BILLS AND NOTES.

M, the father of A, was indebted to B. M had, owing to
some financial trouble, placed a large amount of property in
A's name. M requested A to execute and deliver
Consideration to B a note for the amount of his, M's, debt. B
sued A on the note and A defended on the ground of want
,of consideration. The court upheld a judgment for plaintiff,
asserting that an extension of time of payment of a debt was
sufficient consideration for a note of a third person for the
amount of the debt, and that the acceptance of the note in
payment of a debt, due from one who is not the maker, was
likewise a good consideration: Harris v. Harris, 54- N. E.

i8o (Illinois).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The legislature of Nebraska passed an act (Comp. Stat. c.
93 a., Art. 2, §§ 66, 67), authorizing certain corporations to
Corporations, levy assessments on their shares of capital stock
Stock
Assessments,
Obligation
of Contracts

to defray running expenses, such assessments to

be a lien upon the said stock and to render it
liab'e to forfeiture for non-payment thereof. The
A company was formed prior to this enactment and its stock

v as full paid and non-assessable. After the passage of the
act the company levied certain assessments in accordance with
its provisions, and the stockholders refused to pay the assessments and moved for injunctions to restrain the forfeiture and
sale of their stock under the act. A decree was entered in
their favor on the ground that they were parties to a contract
giving them rights which the legislature could not infringe:
Enterprise Ditch Co. v. o1ffitt, 79 N. W. 56o. The decree
was manifestly right: See I Cook, Stock & Corp. Law, § 492;
Detroit v. D. & H. Plank Rd. Co. (Mich.), 5 N. W. 279.
CONTRACTS.

A was in the habit of insuring the fidelity of his employes
in the B Industrial Guaranty Company. A person applied to
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
A for employment and A then sent to the B cornpany an application for insurance against loss by
reason of the employment. The B company sent A a.cofhtract in which was set forth that in consideration of a certain
sum it guaranteed the fidelity of the employe to the extent of
$5o0, a bond to that effect to be issued and this piper to
stand in place of the bond until the same should be issued.
Across the face of this was written, "subject to result of investigation." In a suit by A against B, on the alleged contract of guaranty, B contended that it was not a contract, but
that the words written across its face made it a mere proposal
on the part of the company to make a contract if the investigations proved satisfactory. The court held it would have
no meaning unless it amounted to a binding acceptance, since
it could not operate as a proposal, A having made the proposal for a contract. It was said that the words written
across the face of the instrument must be taken to mean that
the B company reserved the right to rescind the contract in
case the investigations proved the risk undesirable.
-

CORPORATIONS.

Decisions are rapidly being added by the courts to the list
of cases dealing with the rights of a minority stockholder to
interfere by injunction with the expressed will of
Minority
Stockholder,
Sale

of

B,,iness

the majority in a matter pertaining to the business

management of the corporation. In Phili's v.
Providence Steam Engine Co., 43 Atl. 598, the

Supreme Court of Rhode Island has followed the principle
recognized by it in Hodges v. Screw Co., .I R. 1. 312, to the
effect that where a sale of the corporation's business is necessary because no longer profitable, a private sale agreed to by a
majority of the stockholders will not be enjoined at the suit
of the minority stockholder because he considers the price
inadequate, where there is no claim of unfairness, oppression
or fraud. These cases recognize the principle that within the
scope of its chartered authority the corporate will, as expressed by the vote of the majority, is supreme. The question of whether the business is profitable or not is clearly one
of business policy and rests solely with the stockholders.
The court cites in support of its decision also the case of
Treadwell v. Manufacturing Co., 7 Gray, 393. In that case a
majority of the stockholders voted to sell the corporate assets
and franchises to another corporation and to distribute to the
stockholders of the retiring corporation stock of the corpora-
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tion purchaser in payment for their shares in the old company. The court refused to interfere at the instance of a
minority stockholder who was dissatisfied with the arrangement. This case, while a sufficient authority for the decision
in the principal case, seems to go rather too far, as it involves
not only the question of business policy, whether the corporation should be dissolved or sold as being no longer profitable,
but also sanctions the right of the majority to launch a dissenting stockholder into a new and different business from
that which he contracted to enter when he purchased his
.5t.o::. The principal case is, however, clearly sound: See
Lauman v. Railroad Co., 30 Pa. 42; Sewell v. Beach Co., 50
N. J. Eq. 717.
Burden v. Burden, 54 N. E. 17 (New York), holds that a
by-law passed by the trustees of a corporation will not be set
aside on the stit of a minority stockholder, on
Minority
Stockholder

the ground that its provisions are unreasonable

and in excess of the powers of the trustees, so long as the
trustees act within their charter powers..
Plaintiff and defendant, partners, being unable to agree in
the management of their business, formed a corporation, it
Promotors' being expressly agreed that defendant, who was
Agreements manager of the business, should have a controling interest. A promotors' agreement was executed, providing that defendant was "to take, own, and hold" iooo
shares, plaintiff 998 shares, and a third person the remaining
two shares; the profits to be equally divided between plaintiff and defendant. T , agreement also provided that defendant, "if he shall at any time sell or assign 998 shares of
his said stock, then, and in such case, he will, without any
consideration for the same, transfer the other two shares of
his said stock" to plaintiff. Held, that the last provision did
not prevent defendant from selling portions of his stock less
than 998 shares, without transferring the two shares to plaintiff: Burden v. Burden, 54 N. E. 17 (New York).
CRIMINAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota has been recently called
upon to distinguish between a bailment and a sale, in order to
determine the validity of an indictment for grand
Larceny,
Bailment or larceny. In State v. Barry, 79 N. W. 656, it apSale
peared that wheat was deposited with the defendant
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who gave a receipt for the s.me containing this clause: "Which
amount, and the sum calculated by grade, will be delivered to
the owner of this receipt or his oider." The receipt also.provided that the grain was insured for the benefit of the owner, and
that the latter should pay a certain rate of storage. The defendant sold and shipped the wheat, and upon demand for the
sum or an equivalent amount of grain was unable to furnish
the same. He was indicted for larceny and contended that
the transaction amounted to a sale. He relied upon the case,
State v. .Riegr, 59 Minn. 151. That case was distinguished
by the court on the ground that the receipt there contained
an option to the warehouse man to pay the bearer thereof the
market price in money, less elevator charges, or to deliver the
requisite quantity of the grain, and conviction was" sustained.
DAMAGES.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the case of Friel.
v. Plumer, 43 Atl. 618, has decided that a debtor may recover
damages for mental suffering occasioned by his
Injury to
Property,
creditor's malicious attachment of his exempt
Mental
household furniture. The question whether a
Suffering
person may recover for mental suffering caused
by malicious injury to his property, has been a mooted one.
The same court, in Kim.ball v. Hohnes, 6o N. H. 163, has
held, that for an injury to a pet animal of a plaintiff, there may
be a recovery for the mental suffering occasioned by reason of
the attachment borne for the animal. The case was put on
the ground that such mental suffering was the natural and
proximate result of such an injury. The court in the present
case very properly says, that there can be no distinction between the cases on the basis of any supposed difference between
animate and inanimate objects, the question being simply one
of proximate result.
In most jurisdictions practically the same result is reached
through the doctrine of exemplary damagds, which doctrine is
not recognized in New Hampshire. See Fay v. Parker, 53
N. H. 342; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456. A somewhat
-similar case was decided similarly in Massachusetts: Meagher
v. Driscoll,99 Mass. 281. The doctrine of exemplary damages
does not prevail in Massachusetts : Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass.
552. In states where the doctrine of exemplary damages is
recognized, mental suffering is said not to be a subject for
compensation when it results from an injury to property:
Smitl v. Grant, 56 Me. 255.
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In the same connection we may note the case of Deyo v.
Clouglz, 43 Atl. 653, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
says, "The question of punitive damages is not
Libel,
Wounded
Feelings

raised. The libel was gross and the jury were
properly told that they could give compensation

for the wounded feelings of the libeled plaintiff." It is hard
to see any distinction between the kind of mental suffering
here compensated, and the sort occasioned by an injury to a
plaintiff's property, for which so many courts refuse a recovery.
EVIDENCE.

In Pcople v. Rice, 54 N. E. 48, the Court of Appeals of New

York holds that the fact that a witness has pursued for an
Witness,

indefinite time a study of medicine and of nervous

diseases, in connection therewith, that he is a
manufacturer of medicines, and the publisher of medical books,
and the author of one, the subject of which does not appear,
does not qualify him to testify as an expert on insanity;
though the court is careful to say that if he be in reality an
expert on any subject coming within the domain of medicine,
he is entitled to testify as such, though he be not licensed to
practice medicine.
Expert

In Johnson v. Opfer, 79 N. W. 547 (Nebraska), each party
to a suit upon a promissory note testified of one, and only
Witness,
Competency

one conversation in regard to the matter in issue
-the execution of the note. They differed, how-

ever, as to the time and place of the conversation. The one
gave testimony of admissions made by the other; the latter
offered to show what he said at the time and place when and
where he claimed to have talked with the former concerning
the issuable matter. The rejection of this offer was properly
held error. See Nesbit v. Stringer, 2 Duer, 26.
HUSBAND AND WIIE.

A lived apart from B, his wife. Some years before his
death he put all his personal property in trust for and in the
Fraudulent
Deed,

names of relatives and friends, and also made a

Interestof
Widow in
Husband's

than

deed of all his real estate, whose value was less

without consideration, reserving
therein to himself during his life the use and
t

income of the land, with power to sell or mortgage and dispose of the proceeds as he might choose. A
died intestate and without issue. By the Massachusetts
Land
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statutes the widow of such a decedent may take one-half of
the lands for life, and is entitled to take his real estate absolutely, not exceeding $5000. In a bill to set aside the
conveyance, a decree was entered for the plaintiff on the ground
that it was a fraud on the wife's rights: Brownell v. Briggs,
54 N. E. 251 (Massachusetts). The same court has held void
the deed of a husband made to prevent his wife from recovering alimony: Chase v. Chase, 105 Mass. 385; and has
allowed a wife to recover lands, which her husband had procured, to be sold upon mortgage, in order to evade his
liabilities to his wife and to deprive her of her dower: Gibson
v. Hutchinson, 120 Mass. 27.
INSURANCE.

In the case of Rustin v. Standard Life and Accident Co.,
79 N. W. 702 (Nebraska), it appeared that the plaintiff,, the
holder of an accident policy issued by the deAccident
Insurance,
fendant company which exempted the company
Overfrom liability for any accident caused by ' volunExertion
tary over-exertion;" in the performance of his
duties and while attending to his work, had attempted to lift
a heavy weight, and in so doing had incurred the injury for
which lie sought to recover under the policy. He testified
that he did not estimate that the weight was too heavy -for
him to lift and that lie had been accustomed to lifting heavier
weights. It was held that he was entitled to recover, as his
right to indemnity was not lost because the injury resulted
from over-exertion, unless the over-exertion was conscious
and intentional. This ruling is in accordance iith the authorities: Indemni4y Co. v Dorgan, 7 C. C. A. 581 ; Johnson
v. Accident Co. (Mich.), 72 N. W: I 115.
LIBEL.

Oh reargument, the Supreme Court of Minnesota has reve:sed its decision in ifcDermott v. Union Credit Co., reported
What
78 N. W. '967. See 79 N. W. 673. The court
Constitutes, held in its former opinion that the designation of
Commercial
Agency

Reports

a merchant by the word "slow" in a commercial
agency catalogue to indicate to its patrons that the

person in question did not liquidate his debts with promptitude.
amounted to a libel.
The court says in its opinion on the r.argument: - Thus
considered, it by clear implication asserts that the plaintiff does
pay all his bills and that lie does this without being pushed,
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and without the necessity of leaving the claim in the hands of
some one for collection or taking judgment against him, and
that he does not refuse payment of his bills or break his
promises to pay; neither does he let his note, when he gives
one, go to protest, nor is his credit not recommended; but,
on the other hand, he does not pay promptly weekly or
monthly, or always on demand. Our final conclusion is that,
thus considered, there is nothing in the word ' slow' that does
per se injure a man's credit or his reputation for integrity and
honesty or affect his standing in the community in the esteem
and respect of his neighbors." It would seem that this is
rather an ingenious explanation of a rather obvious terminology. The decision was dissented from by two judges.
What, perhaps, influenced the decision as much as anything
was the fact mentioned by the court that an opposite conclusion would open the door to a mass of profitless litigation.
MORTGAGES.

A mortgage was executed under agreement that it should
be subject to a prior mortgage executed to a third person.
Priority. The prior mortgage was subsequently released
Release of and a new one substituted for the same indebtedFirst
ness. The subsequent mortgagee thereupon
Mortgage claimed that his mortgage was thereby
given
priority. It appeared that the junior mortgagee was not
-misled or deceived, and parted with nothing on the faith of
the release of the mortgage, and the senior mortgagee agreed
to a change in this security only on condition that his priority
should not be affected. Held, that the junior mortgagee did
not gain a priority by the transaction: Roberts v. Doan, 54
N. E. 207 (Illinois).
PLEADING.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Chicago, R. I. & P.
Ry. Co. v. Young, 79 N. W. 557, has followed the rule laid
down by it in Railroad Co. v. VanBuskirk, 78
Death by
WrongfulAct, N. W. 514, and Railroad Co. v. Bond, 78 N. W.
Averment of 7 10, to the effect that in a suit by an administrator
Datmage
in behalf of the widow and children of one killed
by the wrongful act of another, it is a sufficient averment of
damage for the declaration to set out the relationship of the
parties, as a presumption of damage arises therefrom: This
rule is contrary to the general trend of authority in this
country: Regfan v. Ry. Co., 51 Wis. 599. In Hurstv. Ry. Co.,.
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84 Mich. 539, it was held that an averment merely of the
relationship of the parties did not even make out a case for
nominal damages. The same rule is followed in England ii
construing Lord Campbell's act. See English cases cited in
Orgall v. Ry., 64 N. W. 450.
These late decisions of the Nebraska court seem to be a
complete reversal of the former rule of that court.which was
in harmony with the authorities. See Electric Co. v. Laughlin,
45 Neb. 390; Orgallv. Ry. Co., 46 Neb. 4. But see City of
Friendv. Burlegl, 53 Neb. 674, and Ry. Co. v. Crow, 54 Neb.
747. The court recognized the departure from the old rule
and justified it on the ground that the later ruling works more
substantial justice.
PROPERTY.

The Supreme Court of Michigan gives its adherence to the
line of cases which hold that an agreement that one owner is
Party Wall, to build a wall, which shall become a party wall,
Covenants and one-half of the cost of which is to be paid by
Running with the adjoining owner, when the latter uses it, runs
the Land
with the land and passes to the purchaser or
assignee when the contract evinces such intention: Noble v.
Kendall,79 N. W. 81o. See to the same effect, Kingv. Wight,
155 Mass. 444; Mott v. Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312; Rock
v. Ullman, Io4 Ill. i i ; Ins. Co. v. Lee (Minn.), 77 N. W. 794.
It is held that, where the provision of the agreement is that
payment shall be made to the party building the wall, and
there are no words indicating that the right to receive payment shall pass to his assigns, the contract is personal:
Sebald v. Mulholland, 155 N. Y. 455 ; Vight v. Wallace, 179
Pa. 5 20: Joy v. Bank, I 15 Mass. 6o.
WILLS.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Rellnges'Estte, 79 N.
W. 78(, has handed down avery elaborate opinion on the subject
,Provision for of a presumed intestacy by reason of the non-proAfter-horn vision in a will for after-born children.
In that
Children
case it appeared that the testator devised his estate
to his x.if,-. directing that she should hold it until the youngest
of his,. i:dren, if any are born, should attain twenty-one years
of age. without directing that it should then go to such children o naking any disposition of it. The court found no
difficu!" : in holding that in accordance with the general rule
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that the court will do its utmost to *ascertain the testator's
intention and will presume against an intestacy that this
operated as a devise to the children on the majority of the
youngest child. The question then presented itself, whether
this was a "provision" for such after-born children within the
Revised Statutes, Section 2286, which confer upon an afterborn child the share which he would have had in the event of
intestacy when the parent, by his will, makes no provision for
such child. The court held that this amounted to such a
provision as would satisfy the statutes and the children should
take their shares under the will and not as if the testator had
died intestate.
The cases on the subject of non-provision for after-born
children are very numerous and are usually of small value
out of the jurisdiction in which they are decided on
account of the difference in the object sought to be attained
by the statutes of the various states. The decision in this
case is sustained by the authorities in all jurisdictions where
the statute has for its object the protection of such children
from an apparent oversight or mistake on the part of the testator: See Mann v. Hyde, I7I Mich. 278; Given v. Hilton,
-95 U. S. 591, 594In such states, however, as Maine and Pennsylvania, where
the statute is intended absolutely to restrict a testator from
disinheriting his after-born children, such a decision as that in
the case cited would probably not be reached. In such states
the court is required to go a step further than the court went
in the principal case, and to determine whether the provision
made by the will is a reasonable provision. In Hollingsworth's
Appeal, 51 Pa. 521, it was held that a gift of all the testator's
property to his wife absolutely and the appointment of her as
guardian for all his children, they being committed to her
affection, judgment and discretion for their maintenance,
education and future provision, was not a sufficient provision
for the said children, although the testator distinctly declared
in his will that he so regarded it. It has also been held that
such a provision must not be postponed or reversionary:
Bowen v. Hozie, 137 Mass. 527; Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 Ohio
St. 234; Waterman v. Hawkins, 63 Me. 156; Potter v. Brown,
i I R. 1. 232; Willard's Est., 68 Pa. 327.

